Build Philly Now
BPNBuild Philly Now
Memorandum
TO:Members of Philadelphia City CouncilFROM:Jon Geeting, Build Philly NowDATE:March 2026RE:The Mixed-Income Neighborhoods Overlay: A Parcel-Level Impact Analysis and Recommendations for Reform

Executive Summary

Philadelphia’s Mixed-Income Neighborhoods (MIN) overlay imposed a 20% affordable housing requirement at 40% of Area Median Income (AMI), with no public subsidy, on residential developments of 10 or more units in portions of Council Districts 3 and 7. It took effect July 18, 2022.

This analysis examines 11,431 building permits (January 2019 – December 2025) using a difference-in-differences design that compares development inside the MIN overlay to development outside MIN but within the same council districts. Every methodological choice is deliberately conservative.

37
pp new-construction gap inside MIN vs. surrounding districts (raw within-district)
~1,200
housing units deterred (matched control, incl. conversions)
~240
affordable units lost (20% set-aside)
19
affordable units delivered

The existing TOD overlay shows no evidence of counteracting MIN’s chilling effect. The Mayor’s Transit-Oriented Communities bill would lose at least 1,364 units where MIN blocks its FAR bonus by statute. Meanwhile, the city’s voluntary Mixed Income Housing Bonus (MIHB) has built 194 affordable units and $36.9M in Housing Trust Fund revenue using the incentive-based approach MIN rejected. Portland, Oregon faced the same problems, reformed its program with full public funding, and saw construction restart. Oregon has since made unfunded inclusionary zoning illegal.

1. The Core Finding: New Construction Fell 68.6% Inside MIN

New construction permits with ≥10 confirmed units, annualized
Pre-MINPost-MINChange
Inside MIN27.7/yr8.7/yr−68.6%
Outside MIN (within-district)6.8/yr4.6/yr−31.6%
Within-district gap (upper bound)−37 percentage points

That within-district gap compares MIN’s strong-market submarkets to the weaker-market parcels left outside it, so it overstates MIN’s effect. Against a control matched on market strength, MIN’s isolated effect is +16 to +23 pp — about ~450 deterred new-construction units, and roughly ~1,200 once conversions are counted.

The 31.6% decline outside MIN captures market-wide headwinds. The additional 37 points inside MIN is the policy’s measured impact.

Large Permits (10+ units) by Quarter — Inside vs. Outside MIN

2. Estimated Housing Units Lost

64 fewer large permits were filed inside MIN than expected under a flat (0% growth) pre-MIN rate. Multiplying that by average project size gives a within-district estimate — shown below for transparency, but superseded: it compares MIN to the weaker-market parcels left outside it, so it runs high.

EstimatorAvg Units/PermitLost UnitsLost Affordable (20%)
Mean (within-district, superseded)60.43,866773
Trimmed mean (within-district, superseded)46.62,983597
Median (within-district, superseded)30.01,920384

Headline instead: against a market-matched control, MIN deterred an estimated ~1,200 housing units (1,000–1,400, counting conversions; the stable new-construction core is ~450) — below the within-district figures above.

3. Transit-Oriented Zoning Categories Hit Hardest

52% of all lost housing units inside MIN were in Floor Area Ratio (FAR) bonus zones (CMX-3/4/5, RMX-3, IRMX, ICMX) — the commercial and mixed-use categories deliberately mapped along transit corridors. These zones declined 68% in permits. RM-1 (small multi-family) was flat (+1%) because most projects stay under MIN’s 10-unit trigger.

Large permits inside MIN by zoning category
ZonePrePostChangePre UnitsPost Units
CMX-530−100%8860
CMX-2.5193−82%85368
CMX-382−72%53970
IRMX155−63%1,026346
CMX-4104−55%1,3031,059
CMX-2227−65%538154
RM-12220+1%660599

4. The Voluntary Bonus Outperformed the Mandate

MetricMIHB (Voluntary)MIN (Mandatory)
Affordable units built19419
In pipeline (approved)10221
Revenue to city$36.9M$0
Effect on productionIncentivizes densityDeters construction
GeographyCitywideCD3 + CD7 only

MIN also banned the fee-in-lieu option that generates MIHB revenue. If the ~450 lost units had been built under MIHB, the city would have collected an estimated ~$3.8M for the Housing Trust Fund — enough for ~252 Basic Systems Repair grants for low-income homeowners.

5. MIN’s Pipeline: Mostly Paper

StatusProjectsTotal UnitsAffordable
Delivered (CO)48519
Under construction35615
Expired ZP33511
Stalled (18+ mo)332766
Recent ZP612535

3 zoning permits have expired. Average time since ZP for paper-only projects: 20.9 months. None of the 18 projects are subsidized/LIHTC — all private market.

6. Threat to the Transit-Oriented Communities Bill

Mayor Parker’s TOC bill expands the TOD overlay from 500 feet to a quarter mile. But §14-513(5)(a)(.2) explicitly blocks the 30% FAR bonus for CMX-3/4/5/RMX-3 parcels inside MIN — a 1,364-unit loss that follows directly from the statute, about 9% of the 14,527 units TOC would otherwise produce. A behavioral deterrent likely adds more; the figures below include that component, which is being revised against the market-matched control and should be read as provisional.

DistrictTOC Yield (no MIN)MIN Loss*Net Yield
D3 (Gauthier)5,880−1,779 (30%)4,101
D7 (Lozada)6,076−1,253 (21%)4,823
D1 (Squilla)2,57102,571
Total14,527−3,032 (20.9%)11,495

*Includes the 1,364-unit statutory FAR-bonus block (a hard floor) plus a provisional behavioral-deterrent estimate under revision against the matched control.

7. Other Cities Found a Better Way

Portland enacted an unfunded IZ mandate in 2017. Permits fell 40%. Threshold gaming doubled. In 2024, Portland and Multnomah County fully funded the program (~$220K/unit subsidy). Gaming returned to normal. Construction restarted. On March 4, 2026, Oregon passed SB 1521 making unfunded IZ illegal statewide. Philadelphia’s MIN — 20% at 40% AMI with no subsidy — would not survive that standard.

8. Recommendations

1.
Fund the gap. Close the $175K–$225K per-unit gap between market and affordable rents using the Housing Trust Fund, tax abatement savings, and PILOT revenue — as Portland now does at ~$220K/unit.
2.
Adjust rates and ratios. Align set-aside percentages and AMI targets with what the market can deliver given available funding. Portland offers 10% at 60% AMI or 20% at 80% AMI.
3.
Restore fee-in-lieu and exempt TOC from the FAR block. Remove §14-513(5)(a)(.2)’s MIN exclusion to unlock 1,364 TOC units. Restore the fee option to generate Housing Trust Fund revenue.
4.
Require calibration studies. Biennial reviews tied to construction costs and market rents, as Oregon now requires.

The goal of mixed-income neighborhoods is sound. The mechanism needs to change. Portland found a better way. Oregon made it the law. Philadelphia can do the same.